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bstract 
 
In this paper, the relationships between individual income and ethics formation are studied. 
Our theoretical model explains what happens to individual incomes when a culture 
encourages people to devote life-time efforts to establish a virtuous character. Two 
propositions emerged from the present study. Firstly, if there exists a channel from effforts to 
income via ethics, individual income begins to increase and reaches a peak as more and more 
time is devoted to ethics formation. Additional time after the peak becomes detrimental to the 
individual income. Secondly, time for ethics formation becomes economically useless when 
the channel from efforts to income via ethics dissolves. Our simulations and econometric 
findings support the theoretical explanations.  
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1  A version of this paper had been presented at International Conference at Harvard University on May 31-June 
03, 2010, Boston, USA. 
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1. Introduction 
The growth literature suggests that income level of the richest and the poorest of the world do 
not converge in the long run. This observation is inconsistent with the neoclassical growth 
theory, which predicts poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries. According to 
this theory, there should be an absolute convergence across countries in the very long run, 
meaning that countries have similar steady-state levels. However, differences in saving rates, 
population growth rates, and the position of the production functions imply and produce 
different steady-state levels. That is, if there are differences in those structural preferences, 
countries approach different staady-state levels, hence no convergence between the poor and 
the rich is supposed to occur. Convergence is conditional in the sense that countries only 
having the same steady–state income levels converge in the long run. Pritched (1997:3-5) 
shows that since 1870, the poorer members of the industrialized group grew faster than the 
richer members and convergence in absolute income levels within the industrial group 
appeared as a result. What the particular characteristic was that the industrilized group used to 
share same structural preferences. Different structural preferences were observed within the 
second group of countries, often called developing or less developed countries, so no 
convergence was materialized neither within less developed group nor across groups. New 
growth theories, AK models of technological diffusion, were also consistent with the 
conditional convergence hypothesis.  
The institutions and the culture views in economic growth literature argue that neoclassical 
and new growth theories are unable to explain the ultimate sources of income differences 
across countries. Poor technology and poor capital accumulation only explain income 
differences among countries which have similar structural parameter preferences, but they do 
not explain why countries have poor technology and poor capital accumulation. Institutional 
differences amongst countries produce different levels of capital accumulation and production 
functions, and therefore, each country may have distinct steady-state levels and approaches its 
own steady-state. The speed of the approach and the magnitute of the steady-state levels are 
determined by institutional variations across countries. According to new institutional 
economics, inefficient institutions not only generates relative backwardness but also widen 
the income divergence between the richest and the poorest. Therefore, poor countries should 
devise growth promoting institutions in order to grow faster and catch up the advanced 
countries. Once the proper institutions are in place then the rest (growing faster and cathing 
up the advanced) is driven by the forces explained by the neoclassical and the new growth 
theories.       
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At this point, it is natural to ask ‘what are the institutions that makes the difference in the 
growth and development processes?’ North (1989:1321-1324) points out that institutions are 
the constrainsts that form political, social and economic interactions of people. These 
constraints can have either a formal character such as constitutions, laws and property rights 
or an informal character like customs, traditions, taboos and codes of conduct. When informal 
and formal constrainsts successfully enforced, institutions have real effects on society. In 
short, formal rules and informal constraints together with their own enforcements 
characteristics constitude the term ‘institutions’. Soysa and Jütting (2007: 31) argue that 
informal institutions are considered as the uncodified rules of games in use that shape social 
interactions in society. They are largely self-enforcing through mechanisms of obligation 
either in socially or individually.  
In this study, we attempt to work on individal level because, as for informal institutions, 
micro-level studies are better suited to address the importance of culture and institutions on 
economic growth due to endogeneity and identification problems at aggregate level. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces an index for the 
measurement of individuals’ethics. Section three and four discuss theoretically the impact of 
ethic formation on individual income. Section four tests the theoretical findings and reports 
the econometric results. Final section concludes the paper.   
 
2. What is virtue ethics and how is it related to income?   
 
North (1989:1319) and (2003:1) argue that in the mainstream theory, decision makers 
instantly and costlessly obtain and process all information relevant to trade, hence, frictions 
such as strikes, boycotts and sit-ins do not exist. Contracts are complete in the sense that 
monitoring and enforcing the contracts are carried at absolute precision. All transactions are 
costless and, therefore, institutions do not exist in the neoclassical frictionless world. 
People exchange goods and services and gain mutually from trade. In the case of impersonal 
exchange, wealth-maximizing individuals have asymmetric information about the attributes of 
what is being exchanged, other players and the performance of agents. Problems of enforcing 
the terms of exhange also make parties vulnerable to probable defections. Clearly, when 
parties enter trade, there are gains by engaging in activities such as shirking, cheating and 
opportunism. Cheating, shirking and all forms of opportunism are high in the form of 
impersonal trade, which people angages in one time transactions with one onother. Knowing 
parties, having information about the good or the service that is being exchanged requires 
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elaborate institutional structures so as to lower uncertainies about the possible gains in trade. 
To avoid being cheated, individuals have to devote resources so as to measure the attributes of 
trade. So, transacting is a costly process. If the cost of acquaring such information is 
sufficiently high, exchange will not take place, which is the developmental consequance of 
improper institutions.   
Barriers to trade is related to not only the uncertainty about the possible gains from trade but 
also to people’s moral characteristics. The argument that impersonal trade and one time trade 
of parties create uncertainities about the outcome of exchange are valid if we assume that 
individuals potentially posses immoral characteristics. Is it equally true that self-enforcing 
virtuous characters angaging in trade will also take advantage of one another through 
cheating, shirking or opportunism in trade? At the outset, it can be said that transaction costs 
are expected to be low if institutions of virtue ethics are in place in people’s daily transactions 
and if that information is also known to all parties. 
 
A typical utility function of the individual: 
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
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We define here our new function, which channels efforts into income. 
 
     ' ' '
DEFINITION: The ethical function of the individual : 0, 4  is increasing if for all x, 
x 0,4  with x ,  we have E  E .
E
x x x



 
 
Ibn Hazm (2005:114) points out that the person may have either no ethics (index number 0) or 
has the combinations of four fundamental ethics: justice, wisdom, generosity and bravery. 
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When the person has exactly one of them, he/she gets index number 1. Index number 
increases as the individual tends to be more ethical.2 Four level of ethics can be represented as 
follows: 
0 1,
1 2,
2 3,
3 4.
E
E
E
E
 
 
 
 
  
We assume that T is discretionary. The person predetermines T before allocating it between 
work and efforts. Income provides satisfaction through by consuming goods and services. The 
ethics also contribute to the individual’s utility. By being more ethical, the person is able to 
expect returns in the hereafter as well as in the Earth. People tend to become more 
appreciative to those demostrating the quality of ethical behaivour. The ethics, however, are 
the function of efforts hours exerted by the person. The more efforts the individual chooses, 
the lower will be the number of hours worked in a day. Note that the income earned by the 
person and the ethics that the person demonstrates are both endogenous variables whereas 
wage rate, total time and efforts are exogenous variables. More formally: 
( , ; , , )U u I E w T P   
 
3. The Impact of Ethics Formation on Personal Income    
We assume that the individual has well-behaved preferences. Suppose B, e, i and y are the 
consumption bundles. Following properties hold when the person orders bundles based on 
his/her preferences: 
 
(A) ( , )(       )  (Complete)e i B e i i e e i i e        . 
(B) ( )( )  (Reflexive)e B e e   .  
(C) ( , , )(    )  (Transitive)e i y B e i i y e y       .  
(D)    ( )( : :  are closed sets)  (Continuity)i B e e i e e i     . 
(E)      (Monotonicity)If e i e i e i      
(F) ( )( 0)( , < , )  (Local Nonsatiation)e B i B e i i e          
(G)  ( , , )(    e+ 1   0 1)  (Convexity)e i y B e y i y i y             . 
                                               
2 Normative theories of ethics generaly have three variants in philosophy: consequentialism (utilitarianism),  
deontological ethics and virtue ethics. Virtue ethics emphasize the moral character of the person, and is about 
‘being’ rather than ‘doing’. For more information, see Hursthouse (1999). 
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Again, positive and diminishing marginal utilities for all positive levels of income and ethics 
are assumed. The person’s utility increases as the possession of the endogeneous variables 
grows. However, the incremental additions to the utility are diminishing.  
 
PROPOSITION 1. Let ( , )u E I be the utility function of the individual, where u increases at 
decreasing rate. Given the  constraints: ( )I w E T P     and ( )E e P , there exists an amount 
of time spent in efforts (P),  which income attains at maximum. 
 
PROOF 1:  Our proposition can be proved based on the assumptions, 4 and A through G. The 
constrained utility-maximization problem is:  
Maximize ( , )U u I E , subject to ( )I w E T P     and ( )E e P . 
The langrangian function and its first order conditions are: 
 
( , , , ) ( , ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )I E u I E w E T P I e P E              
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
 


 
  
 
 
    
 

   


  





-3 
 
The implicit function theorem allows us to perform comparative statistics by totally 
differantiating the first order conditions evaluated at the critical points, ( , , , ).I E   That is, 
The equations below which are in the form of ( , , , ; , , ) 0F E I w T P    can be solved for 
, , ,E I   . 
 
( ) 0
( ) 0
( , ) 0                                       
( , ) ( ) 0
I
E
wE T P I
e P E
U I E
U I E w T P

 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 -4 
 
After totally differentiating and arranging in matrix notation, we get the following: 
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( ) ( )
0 0 1 ( )
0 0 0 1
  
1 0
0
( ) 1
( ) ( )
II IE
IE EE
dwE T P wE dT dPdw T P
ded
dP
dP
U U d I
w T P U U
d E dw T P w dT dP


 


                                        
 -5 
 
Solving for 
d I
dP

, we have 
 
( )
0                    -6
1
de
wE w T Pd I dP
dP H
   
    

 
 
We expect a positive sign even though we are unable to sign the impact of efforts on the 
personal income beforehand. Depending on the numerator, the result could actually be one of 
the following: 
 ( )  ,   0
de d I
If w T P wE then
dp dP

   ,                    -7 
  ( )  ,   0
de d I
If w T P wE then
dp dP

   ,                  -8            
 ( )  >  ,   0
de d I
If w T P wE then
dp dP

  .                   -9 
 
Suppose that the wage rate ( )w  and the total time ( )T are not changing. As the time of efforts 
increases, number of hours worked and marginal ethics of efforts both decrease; however, the 
amount of ethics increases. It is important to note that a relative strength between the amount 
of ethics ( )E and marginal ethics of efforts ( )de dP determines the final impact. If marginal 
ethics of efforts is larger than the amount of ethics, then efforts augments personal income. If 
the reverse is true, then efforts is associated with a reduction in personal income. There is in 
fact a certain threshold point which switches net impact of efforts on personal income. For 
example, the individual may start with no ethics at all. Then net impact is zero. When the 
individual begins to make an effort (work a lot, make an effort little), marginal ethics of 
efforts is at first expected to be bigger than the total ethics the person has. The net impact is 
therefore positive, and efforts increases personal income. However, if the individual continues 
to devote more and more time to be a virtueous, and to devote less and less time to working, a 
 8
threshold point on the way is reached. Once the individual crosses this threshold, further time 
devoted to efforts begin to reduce the invidual income. Therefore, more efforts, after the 
threshold, becomes demaging in the sense of income level. 
In general, two types of effect are present: Direct effect and indirect effect. A reduction in the 
number of hours worked directly decreases income because wage rate is multiplied by a less 
working hours now. At the same time, an increase in the efforts time augments the amont of 
ethics, which rises income; hence, indirect effect. Both effects are contrary to one another. If 
direct effect dominates, then the amount of efforts decreases income; otherwise efforts rises 
income.  
 
3.1. An Illustrative Example 
 
The Cobb-Douglas utility function, 1( , )U I E I E  , can be a function of the representative 
individual, whose characteristics were outlined in the previous section. When we 
monotonically transform this function and maximize it subject to the constraints, we get the 
following: 
 
   ( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
            ( )       
Maximize U I E Log I Log E
subject to I W E T P and E P
     
    
                    -10 
 
After solving the problem, the indirect utility function becomes the function of all exogenous 
variables: 
 
3/2( , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )U I E Log W P T W P Log P                    -11 
 
Table 1 displays changes in the endogenous varibles as well as in the utility function as a 
result of variations of the time spent in efforts. Exogenous variables and parameters, w , T , a 
and (1-a) , are chosen to be fixed at arbitrary levels. As the individual begins to spend time in 
efforts, his income and utility levels increase at first. The individual’s income level attains a 
maximum at 11 labor hours (at 5 efforts hours); however, the individual’s utility reaches the 
maximum at 8 labor hours. If the individual continues to increse the time spent in efforts, P, 
after these maximums, income and utility levels begins to decrease.   
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[TABLE1 HERE] 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
 
Figure 1 and 2 exhibit variations in ethics, marginal ethics and marginal ethics of total labor. 
In figure 1, the individual marginal ethics of total labor is larger than the level of ethics of the 
individual. As the time spent in efforts increases, the marginal ethics of total labor diminishes 
while the amount of ethics grows. In this region, efforts is beneficial to income level. They 
crosses at a certain level (around 5.3 efforts hours in the function) and the maximum 
attainable level of income is reached. Thereafter, the relative sizes alter and income level 
decreases. After this threshold, the time put in efforts is detrimental to the income level of 
individual. Figure 2 displays the similar pattern between marginal ethics and the amount 
ethics.  
 
4. The Absence of the Link  
It is important to note what happens when the link between efforts and income via ethics 
dissolves.  
  
PROPOSITION 2. Let ( , )u I E be the utility function of the individual. Given the 
constraints: ( )I w T P    and ( )E e P , the amount of time spent in efforts (P) reduces 
income. 
 
PROOF 2: Our proposition can be proved based on the assumptions, 3 and A through G. The 
constrained utility-maximization problem is:  
Maximize ( , )U u I E , subject to ( )I w T P    and ( )E e P . 
The langrangian function and its first order conditions are: 
 
( , , , ) ( , ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )I E u I E w T P I e P E           
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The implicit function theorem allows us to perform comparative statistics by totally 
differantiating the first order conditions evaluated at the critical points, ( , , , ).I E   That is, 
The equations below which are in the form of ( , , , ; , , ) 0F E I w T P   can be solved for 
, , ,E I   . 
 
( ) 0
( ) 0
( , ) 0
( , ) 0
I
E
w T P I
e P E
U I E
U I E


 
 
   
 
 
 
                                      -13  
 
After totally differentiating and arranging in matrix notation, we get the following: 
 
( ) ( )
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0
0
0 1
0
II IE
EI EE
dw T P w dT dPd
ded
dP
dP
U U d I
U U
d E




                                     
                    -14 
 
Solving for 
d I
dP

, we have  0
1
d I w
dP H


    

                                     -15 
 
5. Econometric Estimation 
In this section, we estimate our theoretical model based on a survey sample. The survey 
questionnaire is distributed to randomly selected individuals via e-mail in Turkey. There are 
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34 respondents who give an answer to each question, and only those individuals are selected 
for the sample.3  
The income function is expressed in its stochastic form as 
 
( )i i i i iI W E T P                                         -16 
where   
 I = Income  
 W= Wage rate 
 E= The level of individual ethics  
 T= Total time available for work and efforts 
 P= Time spent in efforts     
 
All variables are in daily basis. In the above stochastic income function, the relationship 
between individual income and inputs is nonlinear. Should we log-transform this model, we 
get the linear version: 
 
1 2 3
1 2
( ),                                 -17
  
( )                 -18
 ,
                                            
i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i
LnI LnW LnE Ln T P
and then
LnI LnW LnE Ln T P
or equivalently
LnI LnT P
   
  
   
    
      -19
    
 
We estimate the above log-linear models based on the survey data. Even though these models 
have theoretically noconstant, we also estimate them with constant in order to compare two 
specifications. The results are shown in Table I.  
Table 1 shows that income is positively and significantly associated with labor in both model 
1 and model 2. Holding other inputs constant, a 1 percent change in labor input causes about 
0.34 percent average change in income. Therefore, in both models, 1 percent increase in labor 
input means 0.34 percent average increse in income of the individual. By the same token, 
model 2 indicates that that the amount of ethics is an important variable for an explanation in 
income change. A 1 percent increse in the amount of ethics is associated with 1.17 percent 
increse in income. 
                                               
3 Survey questionaire is available upon request.  
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The results in Model 4 are concordant to the results in model 2. The total time available for 
work and efforts are significantly and positively associated with income. A 1 percent increase 
in the total time input led on the average to about 1.91 percent increase in income. Similarly, 
holding total time constant, a 1 percent increse in the time of efforts causes a 0.42 percent 
increase in income. Therefore, these partial elasticities of ethics and efforts imply that optimal 
level of efforts time has not been yet reached by individuals. Efforts is beneficial to income.        
Table 3 and 4 simulated model 2 and 4, respectively, in the regressions table.4 In both tables, 
the mean of the each coefficient has the expected sign, and the means of t-ratios of ethics and 
total time are significant.  
Table 5 and 6 simulated the same models based on the hypothetical sample.5 The means of all 
coefficients have their expected signs, and the means of t-ratios of wage rate and total time are 
significant.   
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have introduced insights regarding developmental issues at microeconomic levels. 
Attempts by countries to be economically a developped country would be seriously thwarted 
not by poor capital, yet by institutions. People respond incentives. If society values virtuous 
characters to such an extent that individuals put some efforts in order to become a virtuous 
person, individual incomes are likely to be effected A country may undervalue the work to be 
economically prosperous and discourages its individuals to work for the market to the extent 
that the economic progress of the developing countries is halted or slowed down at the 
microeconomic level. An individual who strive to be a virtuous character lowers barriers to 
trade by not engaging all forms of opportunism, shirking and cheating in impersonal trade. 
Being a virtuous is not costless, and it takes time and efforts in order to conduct ethical 
behaivors continuously.      
                                               
4 Survey sample is used for sampling with replacement. Shazam command file is available upon request.   
5 The hypothetical sample is formed so that all logically possible numbers for each variable can be selected. 
Sampling with replacement is used. The sample and the shazam command file are available upon request. 
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Two propositions emerged from the present study. Firstly, if there exist a channel from efforts 
to income via ethics, individual income begins to increase and reaches a peak as time for 
efforts increases. Additional efforts after the peak becomes detrimental to the individual 
income. Therefore, our model appropriately explains both low and high efforts for ethics 
formation. Secondly, efforts becomes economically useless when the channel from efforts to 
income through ethics dissolves.                     
Our econometric findings and simulations for Turkey support the theoretical explanations. We 
found that the channel of ethics exists and that time for efforts increases income to such an 
extent that high efforts do not appear.     
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Table 1. Indirect Utility Function and its Components 
w T P T-P a 
 
( , )U I E  
 
3/2( )Log W P T W P       (1 ) ( )Log P
 
5 16 1 15 0,5 0,938 0,938 0,00 
5 16 2 14 0,5 1,073 0,998 0,08 
5 16 3 13 0,5 1,145 1,026 0,12 
5 16 4 12 0,5 1,190 1,040 0,15 
5 16 5 11 0,5 1,220 1,045 0,17 
5 16 6 10 0,5 1,239 1,044 0,19 
5 16 7 9 0,5 1,249 1,038 0,21 
5 16 8 8 0,5 1,253 1,027 0,23 
5 16 9 7 0,5 1,249 1,011 0,24 
5 16 10 6 0,5 1,239 0,989 0,25 
5 16 11 5 0,5 1,220 0,959 0,26 
5 16 12 4 0,5 1,190 0,920 0,27 
5 16 13 3 0,5 1,145 0,867 0,28 
5 16 14 2 0,5 1,073 0,787 0,29 
5 16 15 1 0,5 0,938 0,644 0,29 
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                                    Figure 1. Marginal Ethics of Total Labor (ME_T_P) and Ethics (E)  
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Figure 2. Marginal Ethics (ME) and Ethics (E) 
 
   Table2. Regressions for Income 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.5710 
(0.1576) 
 3.9422*** 
(7.380) 
 
LNW -0.022 
(-0.1936) 
-O.0217 
(-0.1887) 
  
LNE 1.0054 
(0.9737) 
1.1691*** 
(9.060) 
  
LN(T-P) 0.3414* 
(1.748) 
0.3429* 
(1.757) 
  
LNT   0.3357 
(1.583) 
1.9391*** 
(31.66) 
LNP   -0.0230 
(-0.1416) 
-0.4157*** 
(-2.169) 
     
N 33 33 33 33 
R2 0.11 0.1099 0.0726 0.0814 
DW 1.97 1.98 1.93 1.9125 
F 906.88 1249.95 1199.26 669.73 
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Table 3. Regression for Income Simulation, Noconstant 
 N MEAN ST. DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
      
LNW 10000 0.0142 0.1243 -0.4728 0.4874 
LNE 10000 1.3379 0.1892 0.6496 2.0350 
LN(T-P) 10000 0.0237 0.2131 -0.8116 0.9135 
      
TRATIO (LNW) 10000 0.1248 1.0410 -4.1687 5.5786 
TRATIO (LNE) 10000 7.4015*** 1.6100 2.5005 15.545 
TRATIO (LN(T-P)) 10000 0.1153 1.0302 -4.1510 4.3968 
      
F 10000 1225.6 285.90 618.33 3768.2 
Table 4. Regression for Income Simulation, Noconstant 
 N MEAN ST. DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
      
LNT 10000 0.6057 0.0302 0.5041 0.7343 
LNP 10000 -0.0704 0.1569 -0.6491 0.6456 
      
TRATIO (LNT) 10000 19.067*** 2.9145 9.8914 39.090 
TRATIO (LNP) 10000 -0.4711 1.0321 -4.4596 3.7383 
      
F 10000 255.37 69.258 109.55 867.17 
Table 5. Regression for Income Simulation, Noconstant (Hypothetical Sample) 
 N MEAN ST. DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
      
LNW 10000 0.8959 0.1722 0.2032 1.3045 
LNE 10000 0.2519 0.2511 -0.3705 1.2896 
LN(T-P) 10000 0.1806 0.2239 -0.6589 1.4630 
      
TRATIO (LNW) 10000 9.5696*** 4.0745 1.1414 30.191 
TRATIO (LNE) 10000 1.6526 1.3965 -3.8810 10.395 
TRATIO (LN(T-P)) 10000 1.0548 1.2035 -3.5750 6.5283 
      
F 10000 244.07 80.19 76.262 984.61 
Table 6. Regression for Income Simulation, Noconstant (Hypothetical Sample) 
 N MEAN ST. DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
      
LNT 10000 0.3558 0.0592 0.0418 0.5102 
LNP 10000 -0.0157 0.2348 -1.1938 2.0541 
      
TRATIO (LNT) 10000 7.5673*** 3.9334 0.3361 26.058 
TRATIO (LNP) 10000 -0.8095 1.0566 -3.3950 8.1311 
      
F 10000 40.547 40.501 0.3356 366.72 
 
 
